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Abstract
We show that a contraction of mortgage supply after the Great Recession has increased
housing rents. Our empirical strategy exploits heterogeneity in MSAsexposure to regula-
tory shocks experienced by lenders over the 2010-2014 period. Tighter lending standards
have increased demand for rental housing and have led to higher rents, depressed home-
ownership rates and an increase in rental supply. Absent the credit supply contraction,
annual rent growth would have been 2.1 percentage points lower over 2010-2014 in MSAs
where lending standards rose from their 2008 levels.
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1 Introduction
This paper shows that a contraction of mortgage credit supply has been a signicant driver
of housing rents and homeownership since the 2008 crisis. Following the crisis, homeownership
rates collapsed to historic lows while housing rents increased rapidly in many U.S. cities. For
example, real rents grew by more than 23% in the top 10% of fastest growing MSAs over the
2011-2014 period. During these years, the median U.S. rent-to-income ratio increased by more
than in the previous 35 years. The large number of cost-burdened renters has prompted policy
debates about what to do (Fernald et al. 2015).
The mechanism that we test was originally proposed by Linneman and Wachter (1989) and
is formalized by Gete and Reher (2016).1 It begins with a shock that contracts mortgage supply
for some lenders such as, for example, greater regulatory costs because of stress-testing. Then,
frictions to substitute across lenders lead to more di¢ cult access to credit. Since downward
house price rigidities prevent most households from buying without credit, households denied
credit move from the market for homeownership to the rental market. An increase in the
demand for rental housing, together with an imperfect short-run elasticity of supply, drives up
housing rents and reduces homeownership rates. Lower price-to-rent ratios encourage investors
to buy owner occupied units and convert them to rentals.
Our identication strategy exploits heterogeneity across MSAs in exposure to lenders which
su¤ered regulatory shocks following the Dodd-Frank Act, approved in 2010. We ask whether
MSAs with greater exposure to these credit supply shocks experienced higher rent growth. The
challenge for our identication is to isolate credit supply shocks from other shocks that drive
both housing rents and mortgage denial rates, our measure of mortgage supply. For example,
an OLS regression of mortgage denial rates on housing rents would be biased if a negative shock
to local activity results in credit stringency, while also dampening rent growth through reduced
amenities.
We use an instrumental variables approach to surmount the previous challenge. Our pre-
ferred instrument is the 2008 mortgage application share of lenders which underwent a capital
stress test between 2011-2015. Since the bank distribution that we use was determined prior
to Dodd-Frank, there is no risk of reverse causality. Calem, Correa, and Lee (2016) document
that stress tests are associated with tightened standards in mortgage markets. We also explore
as a second instrument MSA exposure to the Big-4 banks using a pre-determined measure of
bank distribution across markets, the branch deposit share in 2008 from the FDICs Summary
1Ambrose and Diop (2014) and Acolin et al. (2016) provide empirical support using di¤erent periods and
identication strategies.
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of Deposits.2 Stein (2014) discusses how Dodd-Frank has exposed the Big-4 banks to height-
ened oversight and higher liquidity and capital requirements. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
document the importance of bank branches in facilitating access to credit, and since their sem-
inal work a number of papers have exploited bank branch distributions to create credit supply
instruments (e.g. Nguyen 2016). Finally, we explore as a third instrument the share of top 20
lenders active in 2007. DAcunto and Rossi (2017) use this instrument to study a regressive
redistribution of mortgage credit between 2011 and 2014 stemming from post-crisis nancial
regulation.
We rigorously assess the validity of the instruments. First, we control thoroughly for an
array of local activity shocks, pre-crisis trends and borrower and lender characteristics, making
it unlikely that the error term reects common movers of both mortgage supply and rents.
Second, we provide extensive evidence that in the pre-Dodd-Frank period the instruments do
not correlate with either higher rents or with other factors that cause rent growth. For example,
before 2010 there are parallel patterns between MSAs with the highest and lowest exposure to
the Big-4 and stress tested lenders. Third, placebo tests conrm that the instruments only
capture post-crisis credit supply shocks. Fourth, overidentication tests are supportive of the
instrumentsvalidity. This suggests that we are identifying similar credit supply e¤ects with
di¤erent underlying variation.
All the specications point in the same direction: tighter credit caused higher housing rents
over 2010-2014. Our baseline specication suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in denial
rates increased rent growth by 1.3 percentage points. To put this estimate into perspective it is
useful to look how denial rates changed over 2010-2014. Over this period average denial rates
fell by 1.6 percentage points relative to their 2008 levels. However, denial rates actually rose
in 31% of MSAs. Our estimates indicate that rents would have grown at least 2.1 percentage
points less in these MSAs if their denial dates had moved with the national average. This
e¤ect is equal to 70% of a cross-sectional standard deviation in 2010-2014 rent growth. Thus,
elevated post-crisis credit stringency explains a meaningful amount of cross-MSA variation in
recent rent behavior.
Consistent with the theory, the credit shock captured by our instruments lowered price-to-
rent ratios and had a non-positive e¤ect on housing prices. The e¤ect is more negative for
starter homes, which are more likely priced by constrained buyers. In MSAs more exposed to
the credit supply shock, the correlation between prices and rents is negative, and especially so
where more households face binding borrowing constraints, proxied by a higher minority share.
The credit shock encouraged the conversion of owner occupied units to rentals and lowered the
2The Big-4 banks are Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo.
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homeownership rate.
The previous results are not only supportive of our theory, but they also provide more
evidence to rule out the possibility that unobserved housing demand shocks violate the exclusion
restriction. If that were the case and the MSAs more exposed to our credit instruments also
experienced positive demand shocks, then we might observe not only a positive and signicant
relationship between instrumented denials and rents but also between instrumented denials and
prices. This is because demand shocks can generate comovement between prices and rents as
shown in Gete and Reher (2016) and Gete and Zecchetto (2017) among others.3 However,
we nd no evidence to support this concern. House price dynamics strongly suggest that our
results are due to a credit supply contraction operating through a tenure choice channel.
The instrumentsinability to explain housing rents in a placebo exercise suggests that they
are valid post-crisis credit supply shocks, not that the theory is invalid in the pre-crisis period.
To investigate whether credit a¤ects rents in other periods, we use the Loutskina and Strahan
(2015) instrument which the literature has accepted as a valid credit supply shock. Interestingly,
there is a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of credit supply on rents over the pre-crisis
period.4 We interpret this result, together with the placebo exercise, as further evidence of the
instrumentsvalidity.
As a complement to the core cross-sectional analysis, we also employ a panel identication
strategy that exploits within-MSA variation following various techniques in the literature. The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline cross-sectional study. The
placebo tests are reassuring because post-crisis shocks do not explain pre-crisis rent growth.
Moreover, the panel analysis shows that the divergence in lending standards between Big-4
and non-Big-4 banks, and between stress-tested and non-stress-tested lenders, is a post-2010
phenomenon.
Thus, collectively, the paper uses a broad array of empirical methodologies which suggest
the same result: a contraction of mortgage supply after the Great Recession caused higher
housing rents. This result does not rule out alternative explanations for rent growth, but
instead highlights the importance of the credit contraction theory after rigorously accounting
for these other explanations.
In terms of contribution to the literature, to the best of our knowledge this is the rst paper
3It is also possible for demand shocks to generate no comovement if households are constrained, but we check
that this does not drive our results by extensively controlling for local business cycles. We thank an anonymous
referee for pointing out this alternative possibility.
4The magnitude is much smaller than we found over the post-crisis period, likely because variation in lending
standards over the pre-crisis period was much smaller.
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to study the role of credit supply in the dynamics of post-crisis housing rents.5 The existing
literature on housing rents has thus far focused on other, non-credit drivers like population
ows (Saiz 2007), shrinking leisure of high-income households (Edlund, Machado and Sviatchi
2015), income growth (Hornbeck and Moretti 2015, or Muehlenbachs, Spiller and Timmins,
2015) or householdsexpected duration of stay in a house (Halket and Pignatti 2015). Mezza
et al. (2016) show that student debt has a¤ected the demand for homeownership.
In terms of empirical strategy, our paper complements Chen, Hanson and Stein (2017),
DAcunto and Rossi (2017) and Goodman (2017). Chen, Hanson and Stein (2017) show that
a credit supply shock experienced by the Big-4 banks led to a contraction of small business
credit and caused higher unemployment. Their identication strategy is similar to our use of
a Big-4 instrument, and we control carefully for the factors they highlight, like establishment
creation, to alleviate concerns that local economic conditions are driving the results. DAcunto
and Rossi (2017) document that U.S. nancial institutions have reduced mortgage lending
for medium-sized loans and increased lending for large loans since the crisis. They conclude
that this resulted from a supply-side change, namely the increase in the costs of originating
mortgages imposed by Dodd-Frank. We show that our results hold if we use their instrumental
variable to capture the e¤ect of a contraction of credit on housing rents. Goodman (2017)
documents that mortgage credit has become very tight in the aftermath of the nancial crisis
and discusses potential regulatory causes of this contraction.
There is an ongoing debate on what caused the crisis and what the appropriate policy re-
sponses are. Mian and Su (2009) provide evidence pointing to excessive credit supply towards
low-income households as the cause of the crisis. Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2016) or Foote,
Loewenstein and Willen (2016) argue that loans to low-income households were not the dom-
inant driver of pre-crisis credit ows, and thus policies should not necessarily aim to restrict
credit accessibility for these borrowers. Our results show that policy reforms have especially re-
duced the ow of credit towards households on the margin of homeownership and caused higher
housing rents. However, these increases should be transitory since we also show an increase in
rental supply. From a welfare perspective, it is not clear whether the decrease in homeown-
ership is good or bad. For example, we document that pre-nancial crisis lending standards
were exceptionally low. The standards have tightened since the crisis, perhaps overshooting
the pre-boom conditions.
5There is a large literature that analyzes whether easy access to credit caused the pre-crisis increase in house
prices. See, for example, Albanesi, DeGiorgi and Nosal (2016), Anenberg et al. (2017), Adelino, Schoar and
Severino (2016), Ben-David (2011), DiMaggio and Kermani (2017), Driscoll, Kay and Vojtech (2016), Favara
and Imbs (2015), Foote, Loewenstein and Willen (2016), Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2012), or Mian and
Su (2009) among others.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the underlying theory;
Section 3 has our baseline analysis; Section 4 provides multiple tests to assess the exclusion
restriction; Section 5 studies house prices, homeownership and rental supply; and Section 6
concludes. The appendix explains our data sources, and the online appendix contains additional
results and details on the panel methodology.
2 Motivation and Theory
In this section we describe the theory that we want to test. As Figure 1 shows, following the
recent nancial crisis, housing rents have increased steeply in many MSAs. The rent-to-income
ratio for the median MSA has risen by more following the Great Recession than it did over the
previous 25 years combined. At the same time, the U.S. homeownership rate has collapsed to
historic lows.6
These previous facts suggest an important role for the extensive margin of rental demand,
which is analyzed theoretically in Gete and Reher (2016) and Gete and Zecchetto (2017). Here
we briey sketch the main mechanisms that we will test later in the paper. Households can
decide to buy or to rent. Thus there are two housing stocks: one for owner occupied units
and another for rentals. The rental stock is owned by the wealthy households (e.g. landlords
or investors). Since houses are large and indivisible goods, their purchase requires mortgage
credit for all except for the wealthiest households. Households decide their tenure choice by
comparing the utility from rental versus owner occupied housing, the price-to-rent ratio, and
the cost and availability of mortgage credit. Mortgage lenders set their lending standards such
that lendersexpected revenue, after taking into the account the possibility of default, equals
their cost of funds.
Higher costs for the lender, for example, because of higher capital requirements or the
costs associated with stress-testing, shift the credit supply curve inward. Consequently, more
households are denied credit at pre-shock conditions. Tighter lending standards make some
households unable to borrow at the conditions they want and, given downward rigidities in
house prices, they decide to rent. Higher demand for rental housing, together with an inelastic
supply and imperfect convertibility between rental and owner-occupied units, lead to higher
rents, lower homeownership and lower house prices. As the price-to-rent ratio falls, there
are investors who buy owner occupied properties and place them for rent. That is, the tenure
conversion rate increases. This "buy to let" behavior then induces a positive correlation between
6In the second quarter of 2016, the homeownership rate fell to 62.9%, its lowest level since 1965.
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rents and prices. Moreover, new construction further increases the supply of rental housing.
We check that the data support the predictions of the previous theory. Sections 3 and 4
study housing rents, and Section 5 analyzes the remaining implications.
3 Mortgage Supply and Rent Growth
This section estimates the e¤ect of credit supply on housing rents. The next section
discusses the validity of the instrumental variables that we use to identify credit supply.
3.1 Database
We measure credit supply using mortgage denial rates to avoid capturing any e¤ect from
borrowersreaction to a loan o¤er.7 Our data come from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) which we merge with rent data from the Zillow Rent Index (ZRI) and other controls at
the MSA level.8 The units of the ZRI are nominal dollars per month for the median property in
the MSA. We study MSAs as the unit of analysis, as they are arguably the smallest geographical
unit in which households cannot borrow in one location to purchase a house in another one.
To focus on households contemplating whether to rent or own, we only study applications
for the purchase of owner-occupied, 1-to-4 family dwellings, which include single-family houses
and also individual units within multi-unit buildings, such as condominiums. Table 1 contains
summary statistics of the key variables in our analysis. A detailed description of all the data
sources and cleaning procedures is in the Data Appendix.
3.2 Specication
We focus on di¤erences at the MSA level over the 2010-2014 period, since 2010 was the
year when Dodd-Frank was approved. Our baseline specication is
Avg Rent Growthm;10-14 =  Avg Denial Ratem;10-14 + Xm + um; (1)
7Denial rates are strongly correlated with proxies for lending standards. For example, Vojtech, Kay and
Driscoll (2016) nd that denial rates are closely linked to measures of tightening standards from the Senior
Loan O¢ cer Opinion Survey (SLOOS).
8Zillow computes this index by imputing a rent for each property in an MSA based on recent rental transac-
tions. It does not impute rent using house prices. Figure A1 in the online appendix shows how the ZRI is quite
similar to the St. Louis Feds rent index, which is available for a selection of MSAs.
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where m indexes MSAs, Avg Denial Ratem;10-14 denotes the average denial rate over 2010-
2014 and Avg Rent Growthm;10-14 denotes average annual rent growth over 2010-2014.
9 The
controls in Xm account for both pre-crisis dynamics as well as level e¤ects, including: the 2000-
2008 average annual change in log median income, log median rent, log median house price,
log population, log median inhabitant age, and unemployment rate; and the 2009 level of log
median income, log median rent, log population, log median inhabitant age, and unemployment
rate. We also include state xed e¤ects in all specications.
If we estimate (1) using OLS, we would obtain biased estimates. This is because local
shocks can drive both rent dynamics and mortgage supply. For example, a positive shock
to an MSAs economic activity would increase amenities and thus rent growth, while raising
householdsincome, thus reducing mortgage denials. As a result, the OLS estimate would be
biased downward. Another possibility is that households rent due to a lack of employment
opportunities, so that OLS would produce upward bias.10 Regardless of the direction of the
bias, we aim to overcome it by proposing two credit supply instruments for which there is
extensive evidence that the exclusion restriction is satised.
3.3 The Instrumental Variables
We study two instrumental variables that capture an MSAs exposure to lenders facing
regulatory risk over the 2010-2014 period, where the exposure is measured with pre-determined
variables unrelated to the factors the literature has identied as drivers of housing rents. After
describing the instruments, we provide evidence that they are uncorrelated with local shocks
but indeed correlated with denial rates.
Our preferred instrument is MSA exposure to lenders subject to a Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress test between 2011 and 2015. These tests are meant to
ensure that the largest bank holding companies have enough capital to weather a nancial
crisis, but as a side-e¤ect they have encouraged those institutions to tighten their standards in
mortgage markets (Calem, Correa, and Lee 2016). We measure an MSAs exposure to these
lenders using their pre-shock, 2008 mortgage application share. The results are similar if we
instead weight by deposit share. We prefer the 2008 application share because several CCAR-
9We use average variables because with persistent but non-permanent credit supply shocks it is inappropriate
to estimate (1) using growth in denials as the independent variable. This is because, as we show in Figure A2 of
the online appendix, our credit supply shocks are strongest in the beginning of the 2010-2014 window. Thus they
are positively correlated with average denial rates over this period but, because of mean reversion, negatively
correlated with growth in denials.
10We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this example.
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tested lenders like Ally conduct their mortgage business through non-depository subsidiaries.
We also employ a second instrument which builds on how the Big-4 banks are the only
major mortgage lenders o¢ cially designated as systemically-important nancial institutions
(SIFIs) over 2010-2014. Importantly for the purposes of identication, the SIFI designation is
not based on an institutions behavior in mortgage markets. Stein (2014) describes how the
Dodd-Frank Act subjected the Big-4 banks to heightened oversight and higher liquidity and
capital requirements. As we show formally in the panel analysis of Section 4, these lenders
have tightened credit signicantly relative to other lenders since 2010, and thus di¤erential
exposure to these lenders constitutes a credit supply shock. To measure exposure to the Big-4,
we compute the Big-4s branch deposit share in an MSA in 2008, using the FDICs Summary
of Deposits. The results are the same if we instead weight by the number of branches.
Our key identication assumption is that, once we control for a broad array of factors and
xed e¤ects, exposure to the Big-4 banks and stress tested lenders is uncorrelated with other
drivers of rent growth over 2010-2014. We devote Section 4 to discuss multiple tests that all
suggest that the instruments satisfy this exogeneity assumption.
The second assumption is that both instruments are relevant, that is, correlated with denial
rates. Figure 2 provides visual support and shows strong correlation between the instruments
and average denial rates over 2010-2014. Moreover, in all our results we test for and reject
underidentication.
3.4 Baseline Results
Table 2 contains the estimates of the baseline specication (1). In the rst column we
estimate (1) using OLS, nding a positive but statistically insignicant point estimate. However,
after accounting for the endogeneity of denial rates in the second column of the table, the
instrumental variables estimate suggests an economically and statistically signicant impact of
mortgage supply on rent growth over 2010-2014. A 1 percentage point increase in denial rates
increased rent growth by 1.3 percentage points.
To put the results from Table 2 into perspective, it is useful to notice that the average MSAs
denial rate fell by 1.6 percentage points over 2010-2014 relative to its 2008 level. However, denial
rates actually rose in 31% of MSAs in our sample. If instead denial rates in these MSAs had
fallen with the national average, then, based on our estimate from Table 2, rents would have
grown at least 2.1 percentage points less in these MSAs (1:61:3). The cross-sectional standard
deviation in 2010-2014 rent growth was 3 percentage points. Thus, elevated post-crisis credit
9
stringency explains a meaningful amount of cross-MSA variation in recent rent behavior.
4 Validity of the Instruments
This section is devoted to assessing the instrumentsvalidity and in particular the exclusion
restriction. To address the exclusion restriction we perform the following exercises: 1) parallel
trends analysis; 2) inspection of correlation with standard drivers of housing rents; 3) extensive
local business cycle controls; 4) overidentication tests and sensitivity to alternative instru-
ments; 5) placebo tests; 6) robustness of the results using county-level data and geographic
subsamples. Moreover, we check that the results are robust to functional form using a panel
approach popular in the literature since Favara and Imbs (2015).
4.1 Parallel Trends
Figure 3 plots annual rent growth for MSAs ranking in the top and bottom 25% of exposure
to each instrument. The year 2010 is the critical year when the Financial Stability Oversight
Council was created and CCAR stress tests were announced as part of Dodd-Frank. For both
instruments, we notice a substantial divergence in post-2010 rent growth between MSAs with
high versus low exposure. However, prior to the shock, there are parallel dynamics between
treated and control groups. That is, the instruments appear to only be driving rents in the
post-crisis period.
4.2 Correlation with Standard Drivers of Housing Rents
As an alternative test, in Table 3 we regress each of our instruments on a variety of pre-
crisis trends and MSA controls. To better gauge the magnitude of these partial correlations,
the table normalizes all variables to have a variance of one. This allows us to assess both the
magnitude and statistical signicance of any correlations.11
While it is impossible to directly test the exclusion restriction, Table 3 suggests that the
instruments satisfy it as there is no relevant correlation between common drivers of rent growth
11In Table 3 we use homeownership data from the decennial census because it covers a larger cross-section of
MSAs than our core homeownership data from the Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS), which is available quarterly
but only for 60 MSAs in our sample. We also measure house prices using starter homes, which are likely the
relevant prices for constrained buyers. In online appendix Table A3, we produce an analogous table with data
from the HVS, and the conclusions are the same as we discuss here.
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and exposure to either stress tested lenders or the Big-4 banks. Moreover, as Mian, Su, and
Rao (2013) point out, xed di¤erences such as in the level of house prices or population will be
di¤erenced out in our baseline specication. Most importantly, all our regressions include an
expansive set of controls.
4.3 Business Cycle E¤ects
To rule out the possibility that local business cycles drive the results, or that the results
are a side e¤ect of the small business loan contractions studied by Chen, Hanson, and Stein
(2017), Table 4 re-estimates our baseline instrumental variables specication from Table 2 after
controlling for a wide range of local business cycle variables.
In particular, Table 4 controls for ve measures of contemporaneous economic activity in an
MSA: average annual growth in unemployment, labor force participation, log number of estab-
lishments, log real GDP per capita, and log median hourly wage from 2010-2014. Moreover, we
control for a manufacturing labor demand shock following Adelino, Ma, and Robinson (2017).12
Regardless of which measure we use, Table 4 shows that the point estimate for the e¤ect of
mortgage denials on rent growth is consistently between 1.1 and 1.3 and statistically signicant.
Moreover, the various business cycle measures all enter with the correct sign. This suggests
that regional business cycles and mortgage supply are both important for rent growth, but they
operate independently.
4.4 Overidentication Tests and Alternative Instruments
We now exploit overidentication to assess the validity of the instrument set. First, the
highly insignicant J-statistic in Table 2 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
the instrumentsexogeneity. As an additional test, Table 5 checks the robustness of our results
when using the DAcunto and Rossi (2017) instrument: the 2007 origination share of the top
20 mortgage lenders that year.
The rst column of Table 5 shows that the estimated e¤ect of denial rates is 1.3 when using
the top 20 instrument instead of Big-4 share. This result is almost the same as in Table 2,
and it is statistically signicant. Moreover, the overidentication test continues to support the
validity of all the instruments.
12In our setting this shock is the 2008 employment share of each 4-digit manufacturing industry in an MSA
multiplied by the average 2010-2014 national log employment growth in that industry.
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To second and third columns of Table 5 use as alternative instruments the 2008 mortgage
application share of lenders ranked between 20 and 50 and between 50 and 150 that year,
respectively. These groupings are chosen to capture the spectrum of mid-tier lenders. In
neither column do we nd a statistically signicant e¤ect of denials on rent growth. This
suggests that our results are not driven by local economic conditions since those factors would
a¤ect all lenders and thus be reected in these columns.
4.5 Placebo Test
In Figure 4 we visually inspect the impact of the instruments on annualized rent growth
and average denial rates over 2010-2014. The scatterplot controls for the same variables as
regression (1). It is binned so that each point represents around 12 MSAs. The top panel of
the gure demonstrates strong positive correlation between each instrument and rent growth
over 2010-2014. This role is absent in the pre-2008 placebo version of this gure that is in the
bottom panel of Figure 4. This evidence suggests that the instruments are not contaminated
by pre-crisis rent growth.
To rigorously assess the intuition from Figure 4, we conduct various placebo tests over the
2002-2006, 2001-2005, and 2000-2004 periods. We ask if, when using a specication analogous
to (1), the credit supply shocks can explain rent growth over any of these periods. We should
expect no e¤ect of our instruments on pre-crisis rent growth because the instruments correspond
to specic shocks to U.S. mortgage lenders over 2010-2014, unrelated to other drivers of housing
rents. The placebo point estimates in Table 6 are insignicant across periods, and with the
opposite sign relative to Table 3. This result suggests that the instruments are truly capturing
post-crisis credit supply shocks.
4.6 Sample Sensitivity
To address sample sensitivity, we do two things in online appendix Table A2: rst we
re-estimate (1) on the sub-sample of MSAs in states far from where the Big-4 have their head-
quarters, and then we re-estimate (1) using county-level data. The rst column reports quan-
titatively similar results when dropping MSAs close to a Big-4 headquarters. This makes it
unlikely that the results are due to idiosyncratic location decisions by the major lenders. The
second column shows a positive and signicant point estimate when reperforming our analysis
at the county level. However, the magnitude of the point estimate is smaller at 0.5, consistent
with it being easier to substitute across lenders in di¤erent counties than in di¤erent MSAs.
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4.7 Panel Analysis
In this subsection we check the robustness of the results using a panel analysis that exploits
within-MSA variation. Following Favara and Imbs (2015) we estimate
 log(Rentm;t) =  Deniedm;t + Xm;t + m + t + um;t; (2)
where Deniedm;t denotes the one year change in the denial rate in MSA m between year t  1
and year t. This methodology allows us to hold xed unobserved drivers of average rent growth
over the sample period. However, it necessitates the use of credit supply instruments which
vary over time. We study several candidates: rst, a well-known instrument, the conforming
loan limit instrument popularized by Loutskina and Strahan (2015), which we use to study
the pre-crisis period and then modify for use after the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act; then the
panel versions of the cross-sectional instruments studied in Section 3 that we create using the
methodology of Khwaja and Mian (2008); and nally an instrument that is agnostic about
which lenders are subject to shocks, in the spirit of Greenstone, Mas and Nguyen (2015).13
4.7.1 Credit and Rents After the Crisis: Panel Analysis
The Khwaja and Mian (2008) methodology extracts a measure of lenderspropensity to
deny a loan that is purged of borrower, MSA, and time e¤ects. Figures A4 and A5 in the online
appendix plot these denial propensities based on partitioning lenders according to Big-4 versus
non Big-4 lenders, and according to stress tested lenders versus non-tested lenders.
Figure A4 shows that the Big-4 banks tightened standards after the implementation of Dodd-
Frank and other major regulations in 2011.14 Interestingly, we see little signicant di¤erence
between Big-4 and non Big-4 lenders over the 2000-2003 period. This result is consistent with
Big-4 exposure representing a post-crisis credit supply shock.15
Figure A5 shows that denial propensities by stress tested lenders remained elevated through-
out the post-crisis period, and they increased in 2012. This was the rst year that CCAR results
were made public. The placebo pre-crisis period in the bottom panel shows little signicant
di¤erence between the two groups of lenders, nor is there signicant di¤erence relative to the
13The construction of these instruments is described in the online appendix.
14Figure A6 shows how this e¤ect was especially pronounced among FHA loans, which are intended for
lower-income borrowers.
15In the top panel, the reference lender-year is non Big-4 lenders in 2007, and in the bottom panel the reference
lender-year is non Big-4 lenders in 2004. The magnitudes in Figure A4 are the excess probability of Big-4 or
non Big-4 lenders rejecting a borrower in a given year relative to this reference lender-year.
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reference lender-year (non-tested lenders in 2004). This is again consistent with exposure to
stress-testing representing an exclusively post-crisis shock.
Table A4 contains the baseline panel results. As in the cross-sectional analysis, we begin by
estimating (2) using OLS. The result suggests no signicant impact of credit supply of rents.
However, after correcting for endogeneity with the instruments, the second column obtains a
point estimate of 2.1 for the parameter of interest, which is very close to the estimate from
Section 3.4. Furthermore, we reject the null hypothesis that the model is underidentied, and
the highly insignicant J-statistic provides evidence of the instrumentsexogeneity.
Table A5 performs a panel placebo test.16 The Big-4 and stress test panel instruments
should fail to explain rents during the pre-crisis placebo window. Indeed Table A5 shows no
economic or statistical signicance. Moreover, the point estimates are negative. This nding
suggests that the instruments capture credit supply shocks unique to the post-crisis period.
4.7.2 Credit and Rents Before the Crisis: the Conforming Loan Limit Instrument
None of the instrumental variables specications that we studied before was able to explain
housing rents in the pre-crisis period. We believe this suggests that the instruments are valid
post-crisis credit supply shocks, not that the theory is invalid in the pre-crisis period. To
investigate whether credit a¤ects rents in other periods, we use the Loutskina and Strahan
(2015) instrument which the literature has accepted as a valid credit supply shock. Thus, we
use the triple product of: (a) the fraction of applications from MSA m in year t  1 within 5%
of the conforming loan limit in year t; (b) MSA ms elasticity of housing supply as estimated
by Saiz (2010); and (c) the change in the log conforming loan limit between year t  1 and year
t.
The results in online appendix Table A6 suggest a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect
of credit supply on rents in the pre-crisis period. However, the magnitude is much smaller than
we found over the post-crisis period, as it suggests a 1 percentage point increase in denials led
to a 0.07 percentage point increase in rent growth.17 Most importantly for this paper, Table
A6 suggests that credit supply can a¤ect rents in any period. We interpret this result, together
with the result that none of the instruments used in Section 3 can explain housing rents in
the pre-crisis period, as further evidence that those instruments just capture post-crisis credit
16The online appendix provides other validity tests, including tests of instrument sensitivity.
17One explanation is that there was little variation in credit supply over the pre-crisis period, as suggested by
the bottom panels of Figures A4 and A5 discussed below. Other possibilities are that householdstenure choice
was less responsive to credit supply in that period, or that there were fewer frictions to substitute between
lenders.
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supply shocks.
5 Channels
The previous two sections robustly documented that tight credit supply has increased rent
growth. To assess whether tenure choice is indeed the relevant mechanism, we now test ve
additional implications of the theory discussed in Section 2. First, mortgage denials should lead
to lower price-to-rent ratios and have a non-positive e¤ect on house price growth.18 Second, as
rents rise, "buy to let" investors convert owner occupied units to rentals. Third, the homeown-
ership rate must fall due to the combined e¤ects of tight credit and expanding rental supply.
Fourth, rental demand stimulates construction of multifamily units. Fifth, the credit-to-rent
channel should be stronger where it is more di¢ cult to substitute across lenders, for example
because of di¤erent regulatory requirements across mortgage markets.
5.1 House Prices
Our theory implies that, at least in the short run, price-to-rent ratios should fall and there
should be zero or possibly a negative e¤ect on house prices. To test this hypothesis, the rst
column of Table 7 re-estimates (1) replacing the outcome variable with the average growth in the
price-to-rent ratio over 2010-2014. The point estimate is negative and statistically signicant,
consistent with the theory.
In columns two and three of Table 7, we study house price growth directly. The second
column restricts attention to starter homes, since these houses are more likely to be priced
by households denied mortgage credit and are thus more likely to have a negative price re-
sponse.19 In the third column we study all homes. In neither column do we nd a signicant
e¤ect of mortgage denials on house prices, and the point estimate for starter homes is indeed
substantially more negative in magnitude than the estimate obtained using all homes.
Figure 5 provides complementary visual evidence of the relationship between rent and price
growth for starter homes. For MSAs with high exposure to the credit supply instruments,
dened as an above-median value for both instruments, there is a negative relationship between
rent and price growth. By contrast, the relationship between rents and prices is positive for
18We are very grateful to the editor for this suggestion.
19The price of starter homes is measured using Zillows Bottom Tier Index, which tracks the median home
value among houses in the bottom third of the market.
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MSAs with low exposure. Consistent with Table 7, the credit supply shock led to a substitution
between rental and owner occupied properties for households denied a mortgage.
Online appendix Table A8 corroborates the previous nding by estimating an OLS speci-
cation where the key independent variables are the 2008 mortgage application share of stress
tested lenders, our preferred credit supply instrument, and its interaction with an indicator of
whether the MSA had an above-median share of mortgage applications from blacks or Hispanics
in 2009.20 The outcome variable is the average change in house prices over 2010-2014. The idea
is that minority borrowers are more likely on the margin of homeownership. Thus markets with
a high minority share may even see a negative relationship between the credit supply shock and
house prices as these borrowers substitute between rental and owner occupied properties. This
is indeed what we nd, with a negative and signicant point estimate on the interaction term.
These results are not only supportive of our theory, but they also contribute to rule out
the possibility that unobserved housing demand shocks violate the exclusion restriction. If that
were the case and the MSAs more exposed to our credit instruments also had positive demand
shocks, then we should observe not only a positive and signicant e¤ect between instrumented
denials and rents but also between instrumented denials and prices. This is because demand
shocks generate comovement between prices and rents as shown in Gete and Reher (2016) and
Gete and Zecchetto (2017) among others. Table 7 shows no evidence supporting that argument.
Thus, the dynamics of prices reported in Table 7 strongly suggest that our results in Table 2
are due to a credit supply contraction operating through a tenure choice channel.
5.2 Tenure Conversion
The decoupling of rent and price growth from Table 7 suggests a protable opportunity
for "buy to let" investors. One would therefore expect to see increased conversion of owner
occupied properties to rental units. Using data from the American Housing Survey (AHS),
which tracks the same housing unit over time, we compute the fraction of rental units in an
20Following Angrist and Pischke (2009) we avoid estimating instrumental variable models with interactions
and instead Table A8 estimates:
Avg House Price Growthm;10-14 = 1  Testedm;08 + 2  Testedm;08 High Minoritym;08 + Xm + um; (3)
where Avg House Price Growthm;10-14 is the average annual change in the log of the Zillow Home Value Index
over 2010-2014, Testedm;08 is the 2008 mortgage application share of lenders which underwent a stress test
between 2011-2015, and High Minoritym;08 indicates whether the MSA had an above-median share of mortgage
applications from blacks or Hispanics in 2008. As in Table 2 we control for the 2009 value of the outcome
variable and the other controls of Table 2.
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MSA which were owner occupied in the previous period.21 Then, we test the "buy to let"
channel by re-estimating (1) replacing the outcome variable with the MSAs tenure conversion
rate over 2011-2013.22
Table 8 contains the results of this exercise. In the rst column, we nd a positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect of mortgage denial rates on tenure conversion. This is consistent
with investors responding to a credit-induced demand for rentals by purchasing owner occupied
units and subsequently renting them out.
In the second column of Table 8, we look for a longer-term e¤ect by replacing the outcome
variable with the tenure conversion rate over 2003-2013. The highly insignicant point estimate
suggests that the post-crisis credit supply shock did not raise tenure conversion rates relative
to pre-crisis levels. This nding relates to the welfare question of whether the shock led to
abnormally tight standards and high rental demand, or whether it helped correct abnormally
loose standards and low rental demand during the boom period. For example, online appen-
dix Figure A3 shows how the spike in mortgage denials in 2010 did not raise the denial rate
substantially above pre-boom levels. We leave welfare questions for future research.
5.3 Homeownership
A key implication of our theory is that the homeownership rate falls as households cannot
obtain mortgage credit and the stock of rental units grows. Using data on MSA-level homeown-
ership rates from the Housing Vacancy Survey, we replace the outcome in (1) with an MSAs
average growth in homeownership from 2010-2014. The results in Table 9 indicate that a one
percentage point increase in mortgage denials over 2010-2014 reduced homeownership growth
by 0.7 percentage points. This e¤ect is signicant with a p-value of 0.05 despite the relatively
small sample size. This again provides evidence that tight mortgage supply raised rents through
householdstenure choice.
5.4 Multifamily Construction
We now ask whether the supply response documented in Section 5.2 was also accompanied
by construction of new multifamily units. Specically, we look at the growth in permits for the
21We exclude vacant units in our analysis.
22We use 2011-2013 because the AHS is only available in odd numbered years.
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construction of multifamily units.23 We replace the outcome variable in (1) with the average
growth in log multifamily permits over 2011-2014, where we o¤set the outcome window by one
year to account for a lag in the supply-side response because of lengthy permitting procedures
(Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 2008). Table A9 in the online appendix suggests that the recent
rent growth we have documented may dissipate as rental supply expands.
5.5 Lending Frictions
Implicit in our previous analysis is the notion that borrowers cannot easily substitute
between lenders of di¤erent stringency. To measure the ease of substitutability, we utilize
geographic variation in the regulation of mortgage brokers. According to Backley et al. (2006),
states with additional licensing requirements for mortgage brokers have less competition, and
likely stickier broker-lender relationships. That is, brokers may keep referring customers to the
same lenders even if their standards are higher.24
We test the strength of these frictions with an OLS regression in which the key independent
variables are the stress test credit supply instrument and its interaction with an indicator of
whether the MSA is in a state requiring such licensing.25 Online appendix Table A10 has the
results. Notably, the estimated interaction term is positive and signicant. This suggests a
role for lending frictions in strengthening the credit-to-rent mechanism on which our theory is
based.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that tighter mortgage credit can explain a signicant component
of rent growth following the 2008 nancial crisis. Our empirical strategy used variation among
MSAs in exposure to lenders more subject to regulatory costs and stress testing. We controlled
for an array of local shocks and performed a battery of tests to check the validity of all instru-
23We dene multifamily units as the sum of 2 unit shelters, 3-4 unit shelters, and 5+ structure shelters. We
cannot disentangle whether the new buildings will contain rental or owner occupied units.
2418 states listed in the Data Appendix impose the additional requirement that individual mortgage brokers
be licensed.
25Specically, following Angrist and Pischke (2009), the regression equation is
Avg Rent Growthm;10-14 = 1  Testedm;08 + 2  Testedm;08  Licensem + Xm + um; (4)
where Testedm;08 is the 2008 mortgage application share of lenders which underwent a stress test between
2011-2015 and Licensem indicates whether the MSA is in a state requiring individual brokers to be licensed.
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ments. The credit supply shocks used in our identication cannot explain pre-crisis housing
rents and are unrelated to standard drivers of housing rents documented in the literature.
Moreover, consistent with our theory that credit supply operated through a housing tenure
choice channel, we show that our identied mortgage supply contraction also caused lower price-
to-rent ratios, had a non-positive e¤ect on house price growth with a more negative e¤ect for
housing segments priced by constrained borrowers (starter homes and minority neighborhoods),
lowered homeownership rates, and led to an expansion of rental supply, both through "buy to
let" investors and higher multifamily construction.
The previous result suggests that recent regulatory changes may have unintended conse-
quences, resulting in less accessible credit for some borrowers and higher housing rents. Am-
brose, Conklin and Yoshida (2016) present ndings that point in the same direction. On the
other hand, the tighter lending standards may also correct the excessively lax standards dur-
ing the housing boom. Evaluating the socially optimal levels of homeownership and mortgage
standards is an open avenue for future research.
The results also indicate that the price e¤ect of the resulting rental demand will weaken as
supply expands to accommodate more renters. This nding may signal that high rent growth
is self-moderating through increased supply, without the need for rent controls. An interesting
question for future work is the role of the "buy to let" investors in housing markets.
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Appendix: Data Sources
In this section, we describe our data sources, how we cleaned them, and the key variables
used in our analysis.
Housing Rents and Prices
Our rent data cover 302 MSAs from 2007 through 2014. Data for rents and prices are
from Zillow. To measure rents, we use the Quarterly Historic Metro Zillow Rent Index (ZRI).
The ZRI measures the median monthly rent for each MSA and has units of nominal dollars per
month. Zillow imputes this rent based on a proprietary machine learning model taking into
account the specic characteristics of each home and recent rent listings for homes with similar
characteristics. Importantly, the ZRI does not impute a propertys rent from its price. The
median rent is computed across all homes in an MSA, not only those which are currently for
rent. Thus, unlike pure repeat-listing indices, the ZRI is not biased by the current composition
of for-rent properties. To measure house prices, we use the Quarterly Historic Metro Zillow
Home Value Index (ZHVI). The ZHVI is computed using a methodology analogous to that of
the ZRI. Although the ZRI and the ZHVI are available quarterly, we only retain the values
corresponding to the fourth quarter of each year because our mortgage data are at the yearly
frequency. To measure the price of starter homes, we use the Zillows Bottom Tier Index, which
measures the median house price among homes in the bottom third of the market.
We merge all datasets based on year and the MSAs 2004 core based statistical area (CBSA)
code. For sub-metro areas of the largest MSAs, we use the CBSA division code. After merging
with the MSAs for which we have the mortgage data described below, we have rent data for
302 MSAs.
Mortgage Data
Data on mortgage credit come from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The
frequency of the data is yearly. HMDA data contain application-level information on the
requested loan size, loan purpose, property type, and application status. We observe the self
reported income, race, and gender of the borrower, as well as an identier of the lender receiving
the application. Since our focus is on how credit a¤ects rents through housing tenure choice, we
only retain mortgage applications for the purchase of a 1-to-4 family, owner-occupied home. In
terms of HMDA variables, we retain applications satisfying the following conditions: occupancy
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= 1 (owner occupied), property type = 1 (1-to-4 family), loan purpose = 1 (for-purchase), and
action taken 6= 6 (loan not purchased by institution). To maximize data quality, we additionally
require that applications were not agged for data quality concerns (edit status = "NA") and
have a non-empty MSA code. We identify denied and originated loans as those with action
taken = 3 and action taken = 1, respectively. FHA loans are those with loan type = 2.
Our data on MSA population and income also come from HMDA as part of the FFIEC
Census Report. The FFIEC directly reports median family income for each MSA and census
tract, and the population for each census tract. We compute MSA-level population by summing
across census tracts belonging to an MSA. In terms of demographics, we identify applicants as
black if the applicants primary race = 3 and as Hispanic if the applicants primary race = 5
and the applicants ethnicity = 1.
Some lenders require applicants to go through a pre-approval process before allowing them
to formally apply. After excluding applications that underwent pre-approval, the denial rate
over 2008-2014 was 13%; since this is close to the unconditional average of 11.1%, we perform
our analysis including applications that underwent pre-approval beforehand, around 15% of the
sample. We checked that this decision does not a¤ect the results.
We merge the HMDAs application-level data by lender and year with the HMDA reporter
panel. The reporter panel contains each lenders name, total assets, and top holding company.
Within each year, we classify a lender as belonging to the Big-4 if its top holding company
is one of the Big-4 banks. To account for slight changes in institutional names over time, we
identify the Big-4 banks as those whose names possess the strings "WELLS FARGO", "BANK
OF AMERICA", "CITIG", or "JP". Using our classication scheme, if a Big-4 bank acquires
another institution in, say, 2010, then that institution would be classied as a non-Big-4 lender
in 2009 but as belonging to the Big-4 in 2010. We computed the top 20 share using the shares
of mortgages originated in 2007, like DAcunto and Rossi (2017).
Similarly, we classify lenders in HMDA as being subject to a CCAR stress test between 2011-
2015 if their top holder was subject to this test. These holding companies are: Ally Financial
Inc, American Express Co, Bancwest Co, Bank of America Corp, Bank of NY Mellon Corp,
BB&T Corp, BBVA Compass Bancshares, BMO Financial Corp, Capital One Financial Corp,
Citigroup Inc, Comerica Inc, Deutsche Bank, Discover Financial Services, Fifth Third Bancorp,
Goldman Sachs Group, HSBC North America Holdings Inc, Huntington Bancshares Inc, JP
Morgan Chase & Co., Keycorp, M&T Bank Corp, MetLife Inc, Morgan Stanley, Northern Trust
Corp, PNC Financial Services Group Inc, RBS/Citizens, Regions Financial Corp, Santander
Holdings USA Inc, State Street Corp, Suntrust Banks Inc, TD Group US Holdings LLC, MUFG
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Americas Holding Corp, US Bancorp, Wells Fargo & Co, and Zions Corp.
Deposit, Homeownership and Vacancy Data
To obtain deposit shares we use the FDICs Summary of Deposits. We rst group Big-4
and non Big-4 banks together and aggregate deposits for each group to the MSA level, using
the variable DEPSUMBR.
Our data on licensing rules for mortgage brokers come from Backley et al. (2006), according
to whom, as of 2006, 48 states require mortgage brokerage rms to carry a license, while 18
states impose the additional requirement that individual brokers also be licensed. These 18
states are Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin.
Homeownership data come from the U.S. Census Bureaus Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS).
The HVS is a supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to provide current informa-
tion on the rental and homeowner vacancy rates. These data are used extensively by public and
private sector organizations. They cover 60 MSAs over our sample period. We only retain the
fourth-quarter value for homeownership rates, to match the annual frequency of our mortgage
data. In Table 3 we approximate the 2009 value using the 2010 Census value, which covers
more MSAs but it is decennial.
Other Variables
We also rely on the following data sources:
 Age data, unemployment data, and labor force participation data at the MSA level are
from the American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau. This is also our source of data for the share of workers in nancial services. Since
the American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates did not exist before 2005, for the pre-
crisis analysis we instead use controls from the 2000 Census and log median household
income as imputed by Zillow.
 Data on establishment growth come from the Business Dynamics Statistics.
 Data on MSA-level real GDP growth come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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 Data on MSA-level wage growth come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
 Data on manufacturing industry shares used to construct the Adelino, Ma, and Robinson
(2017) shock come from the County Business Patterns dataset.
 Data on tenure conversion rates come from the American Housing Survey. The conversion
rate is dened as the fraction non-owner occupied units that were converted from owner
occupied units over the given time period, excluding all vacant units. We focus on 2011-
2013 because the survey is conducted in odd numbered years.
 Data on multifamily permits come from the Census Bureaus annual Building Permits
Survey. We dene multifamily units as the sum of 2 unit shelters, 3-4 unit shelters, and
5+ structure shelters.
 Our data on conforming loan limits is at the county-year level and begins in 2008. The
data are provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). We merge this dataset
to our HMDA dataset by county and year. Then we collapse them to the MSA-year
level. For MSAs that have counties with di¤erent conforming loan limits, we take the
application-weighted average conforming loan limit among counties.
To summarize, there are 257 MSAs with a full set of controls, mortgage, and rent data
which we use in the core cross-sectional regressions.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Dynamics of Real Housing Rents and Rent-to-Income. The top panel
plots real housing rents over the 1991-2014 period in 2014 dollars for MSAs ranking in the top 10%
and top 25% of 2008-2014 rent growth, respectively. Nominal rents are measured using the Zillow
Rent Index (ZRI), which has the interpretation of dollars per month. The translation to real rents is
done using the Consumer Price Index excluding shelter. The bottom panel plots the median ratio of
rent-to-income for the MSAs in our sample.
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Figure 2. Denial Rates and Credit Supply Instruments. This gure plots denial rates
against the cross-sectional credit supply instruments. The plot controls for the same variables as the
baseline analysis in Table 2.
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Figure 3. Credit Supply Instruments and Rent Growth. This gure plots annual
change in log rent for MSAs ranking in the top and bottom 25% of exposure to each credit supply
instrument: (i) the branch deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008; and (ii) the 2008 mortgage
application share of lenders which underwent a CCAR stress test between 2011-2015. In all plots, the
red solid line denotes MSAs with a high (top 25%) exposure to the shock, and the blue dashed line
denotes MSAs with a low (bottom 25%) exposure.
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Figure 4. Pre and Post-2010 Rent Growth against Credit Supply Instruments.
The top panel plots 2010-2014 average annual change in log rent against the credit supply instruments:
(i) the branch deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008; and (ii) the 2008 mortgage application share
of lenders which underwent a CCAR stress test between 2011-2015. The bottom panel plots the same
variables over 2002-2006. The top panel controls are the controls used in the baseline analysis in Table
2. The bottom controls are the controls used in the placebo analysis in Table 6.
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Figure 5. Rent and Starter House Price Growth by Exposure to Credit Supply
Instruments. This gure plots the average change in log rents and log price of starter homes over
2010-2014. Each observation is an MSA. The left panel is based on MSAs with a below-median deposit
share of the Big-4 banks and a below-median mortgage application share to stress tested lenders in
2008, and analogously the right panel has MSAs with an above-median share for both lender groups.
Rents are measured using the ZRI, and starter house prices are measured using Zillows Bottom Tier
House Price Index.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Avg Rent Growthm;10 14 302 2.641 3.004 -5.637 19.057
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 303 11.147 3.064 4.236 30.211
Big-4 Deposit Sharem;08 303 5.048 11.945 0 79.931
CCAR Tested Sharem;08 303 27.119 12.832 .301 64.338
Avg House Price Growthm;10 14 263 1.423 2.887 -5.363 11.391
Avg Starter House Price Growthm;10 14 250 2.621 15.197 -27.786 51.94
Price-Rent Ratio Growthm;t 264 -60.392 189.174 -1291.651 593.778
Tenure Conversion Ratem;11 13 96 4.316 4.349 0 24.041
Avg Homeownership Growthm;10 14 64 -.731 1.253 -3.85 1.75
Avg Multi-Family Permits Growthm;11 14 280 11.926 50.525 -274.084 317.805
Avg Unemployment Growthm;10 14 298 -.82 .554 -3.05 .825
Avg Labor Force Part. Growthm;10 14 298 -.316 .517 -2.275 1.325
Avg Establishment Growthm;10 14 298 -.372 .722 -1.578 2.852
Avg Real GDP Growthm;10 14 298 .415 1.552 -6.378 4.738
Avg Wage Growthm;10 14 205 3.073 12.674 -41.114 58.629
Avg Rent Growthm;00 08 303 3.218 1.824 -3.344 8.2
Avg House Price Growthm;00 08 264 2.688 1.435 -1.866 6.182
Avg Population Growthm;00 08 302 11.096 10.807 -2.188 47.806
Avg Income Growthm;00 08 302 5.679 1.199 2.428 9.855
Avg Unemployment Growthm;00 08 296 .387 .243 -.257 1.257
Avg Age Growthm;00 08 296 .242 .661 -3.559 1.683
Financial Services Sharem;08 299 5.847 1.825 2.001 17.265
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the key variables in our analysis. All variables
are at the MSA level. Avg Rent Growth denotes average annual change in log rent. Avg Denial
Rate denotes the average denial rate among mortgage applications for the purchase of single-
family homes in the MSA, based on HMDA data. Big-4 Deposit Sharem;08 and CCAR Tested
Sharem;08 are, respectively the branch deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008 and the 2008
mortgage application share of lenders which underwent a stress test between 2011-2015. Rent
and House Price denote the Zillow Rent and Home Value indices, respectively. Starter house
prices are based on Zillows Bottom Tier Index. Tenure Conversion Rate denotes the fraction
of rental units in an MSA that were converted from owner occupied units over the indicated
period. Labor Force Part. denotes the labor force participation rate. Establishment refers to the
number of establishments. Real GDP is in per capita terms. Wages are the median hourly wage
in the MSA. Age and Income refer to the median in the MSA. Multi-Family Permits denotes
permits for the construction of multifamily units. Homeownership refers to the homeownership
rate in the MSA. Financial Services Share is the fraction of workers in nancial services. All
variables are in units of percentage points, up to a log approximation. Full details on our data
sources and cleaning procedures are in the Data Appendix.
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Table 2: Rent Growth and Credit Supply: Baseline Specication
Outcome: Avg Rent Growthm;10 14
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 0.105 1.309
(0.193) (0.018)
Estimation OLS IV
MSA Controls Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.017
J-statistic (p-value) 0.652
Number of Observations 257 257
Note: P-values are in parentheses. The instruments for Avg Denial Rate are: (i) the branch
deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008; and (ii) the 2008 mortgage application share of lenders
which underwent a stress test between 2011-2015. MSA controls are the 2009 log median income,
log median rent, log population, log median inhabitant age, unemployment rate, and the 2000-
2008 average annual change in log median income, log median rent, log median house price,
log population, log median inhabitant age, and unemployment rate. The underidentication
test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 3: Credit Supply Instruments and Drivers of Housing Rents
Outcome: Testedm;08 Big-4m;08
Avg Rent Growthm;00 08 -0.116 -0.032
(0.221) (0.784)
log(Rentm;09) -0.048 -0.200
(0.550) (0.205)
log(House Pricem;09) 0.304 0.178
(0.010) (0.233)
log(Populationm;09) -0.009 0.228
(0.899) (0.024)
log(Incomem;09) 0.141 0.036
(0.193) (0.826)
Avg Unemp. Growthm;10 14 -0.084 0.063
(0.167) (0.495)
Avg Price Growthm;10 14 0.064 -0.135
(0.467) (0.226)
Financial Services Sharem;08 0.055 0.101
(0.364) (0.484)
Homeownership Ratem;09 0.064 -0.020
(0.389) (0.851)
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
R-squared 0.701 0.416
Number of Observations 220 220
Note: P-values are in parentheses. All variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of
1. The outcome in each column is one of our credit supply instruments: (i) the 2008 mortgage
application share of lenders which underwent a stress test between 2011-2015; and (ii) the
branch deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008. House prices for starter homes are based
on Zillows Bottom Tier Price Index. Homeownership rates are from the 2010 Census. Each
observation is an MSA. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 4: Robustness: Business Cycle E¤ects
Outcome: Avg Rent Growthm;10 14
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 1.295 1.166 1.140 1.296 1.314 1.323 1.179
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009) (0.004)
Avg Unemp. Growthm;10 14 -0.996 -1.039
(0.118) (0.130)
Avg LFP Growthm;10 14 0.824 1.159
(0.086) (0.059)
Avg Estab. Growthm;10 14 2.582 3.181
(0.000) (0.000)
Avg Real GDP Growthm;10 14 0.111 -0.191
(0.536) (0.385)
Manufacturing Shockm;10 14 0.284 0.246
(0.514) (0.582)
Avg Wage Growthm;10 14 -0.000 -0.003
(0.992) (0.913)
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.009 0.004
J-statistic (p-value) 0.580 0.535 0.698 0.661 0.666 0.919 0.605
Number of Observations 257 257 257 257 257 179 179
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Avg Unemployment Growthm;10 14, Avg Labor Force Partic-
ipation Growthm;10 14, Avg Establishment Growthm;10 14, Avg Real GDP Growthm;10 14 and
Avg Wage Growthm;10 14 denote the average annual change in those variables in MSA m from
2010-2014. Manufacturing Shockm;10 14 is the Bartik manufacturing shock used by Adelino,
Ma, and Robinson (2017), which in our setting is the 2008 employment share of each 4-digit
manufacturing industry in MSA m multiplied by the average 2010-2014 national log employ-
ment growth in that industry. The instruments for Avg Denial Rate and other MSA controls
are the same as in Table 2. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 5: Rent Growth and Credit Supply: Sensitivity to Lender Size
Outcome: Avg Rent Growthm;10 14
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 1.287 -1.248 -0.498
(0.021) (0.492) (0.762)
Estimation IV IV IV
Instruments Top 20, Tested Top 20-50 Top 50-150
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.017 0.340 0.382
J-statistic (p-value) 0.494
Number of Observations 257 257 257
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Tested denotes the 2008 mortgage application share of
lenders which underwent a stress test between 2011-2015. Top 20-50 and Top 50-100 denote
the 2008 application share of lenders ranking between 20 and 50 and between 50 and 100 in
terms of total originations that year. Top-20 is the DAcunto and Rossi (2017) instrument,
which in our setting is the 2007 origination share of the top 20 mortgage lenders that year.
The remaining notation and controls are the same as in Table 2. The underidentication test
is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 6: Placebo: Credit Supply and Rents Before the Crisis
Outcome: Avg Rent Growthm;period
Avg Denial Ratem;period -0.292 -0.230 -0.266
(0.160) (0.232) (0.191)
Period 2002-2006 2000-2004 2001-2005
Estimation IV IV IV
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.021 0.085 0.030
J-statistic (p-value) 0.414 0.194 0.244
Number of Observations 173 173 173
Note: P-values are in parentheses. The outcome in each column is average rent growth over
the specied period. The instruments for Avg Denial Rate are the variables from Table 2.
MSA controls are the 2000 log median income, log median rent, log population, log median
inhabitant age, log median house price, and unemployment rate. The underidentication test
is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 7: Price-to-Rents, House Prices and Credit Supply
Outcome: Avg Price-to-Rent Growthm;10 14 Avg Price Growthm;10 14
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 -60.904 -1.334 0.295
(0.028) (0.526) (0.414)
Home Type All Starter All
Estimation IV IV IV
MSA Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.017 0.131 0.041
J-statistic (p-value) 0.291 0.085 0.213
Number of Observations 257 208 257
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Price Growthm;10 14 denotes the average annual change in
the log of MSA m median house price over 2010-2014, and Avg Price-to-Rent Growthm;10 14
denotes the analogous change in the price-to-rent ratio. The rst and third columns use all
homes, based on Zillows Home Value Index (ZHVI). The second column uses starter homes,
based on Zillows Bottom Tier Price Index. The instruments for Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 are the
variables fromTable 2. MSA controls are those fromTable 2 and, in columns two and three, 2009
log house prices for the indicated home type. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen
and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 8: Tenure Conversion and Credit Supply
Outcome: Tenure Conversion Ratem
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 1.059 -0.069
(0.020) (0.949)
Conversion Window 2011-2013 2003-2013
Estimation IV IV
MSA Controls Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.050 0.050
J-statistic (p-value) 0.425 0.862
Number of Observations 89 89
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Tenure Conversion Ratem denotes the fraction of rental
units in MSA m that were converted from owner occupied units over the indicated conversion
window. The instruments for Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 are the variables from Table 2. MSA
controls are those from Table 2 and the fraction of non-vacant units in 2009 that were owner
occupied. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation
is an MSA. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 9: Homeownership and Credit Supply
Outcome: Avg Homeownership Growthm;10 14
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 -0.706
(0.053)
Estimation IV
MSA Controls Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.010
J-statistic (p-value) 0.863
Number of Observations 60
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Avg Homeownership Growthm;10 14 denotes the average
annual change in the homeownership rate in MSA m over 2010-2014. The instruments and
controls are the variables from Table 2 plus the homeownership rate in 2009. The underiden-
tication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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ONLINE APPENDIX. NOT-FOR-PUBLICATION.
In this appendix we discuss in detail the panel analysis summarized in Section 4.7.
LendersPropensity to Deny
Following the methodology of Khwaja and Mian (2008), we estimate a xed e¤ect for a
given lender or group of lenders. Specically, let L denote the set of lenders we observe in
HMDA, and consider a partition of L into disjoint subsets l1; l2; :::; ln. For example, we can
partition lenders according to whether or not they are held by a Big-4 bank, corresponding to
l1 = fBig-4g; l2 = fnon Big-4g.
To extract a credit supply shock experienced by lenders of set lj, we estimate the probability
of loan denial at the application level, Pr(Deniedi;m;t;lj = 1); as a linear probability model,
Pr(Deniedi;m;t;lj = 1) =
X
j
t;lj + Xi;m;t;lj + m;t + m;lj ; (A1)
where our focus is on the t;lj , which is a vector of xed e¤ects for lenders of set lj in year
t.26 The controls in Xi;m;t;lj account for the characteristics of borrowers: income, requested
loan-to-income, and race of borrower i applying for a loan from lender type lj in MSA m in
year t.27 The terms m;t and m;lj control for lender, time, and regional shocks. The value m;t
is the coe¢ cient on an indicator variable which equals 1 if the borrower applies from MSA m
in year t and equals 0 otherwise. Likewise the indicator variable m;lj equals 1 if the borrower
applies from MSA m to a lender of type lj and equals 0 otherwise.
The vector t;lj captures the lender specic component of denial rates. For example, it may
reect a higher cost of funds or greater regulatory risk borne by lenders of set lj in a given year.
Importantly, t;lj does not confound either borrower or regional e¤ects, since these are already
captured by Xi;m;t;lj and the pair (m;t; m;lj), respectively. To emphasize this interpretation,
we refer to t;lj as the propensity to deny.
26We estimate the t;lj using a series of indicator functions for whether the application was received by lenders
of set lj in year t. The reference category will be applications to lenders of some set lr in some year tr.
27We use 21,709,935 observations to estimate (A1) over 2007-2014.
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Panel Instruments
We use four instruments to conduct the panel analysis. The rst two are based on the
denial propensities for Big-4 and stress tested lenders. First, we proceed by estimating (A1)
using the partition L = fBig-4;NonBig-4g and construct the Big-4 shock as
Vm;t = (t;Big-4   t;NonBig-4) Big-4 Deposit Sharem;08: (A2)
In words, Vm;t captures the relative stringency of the Big-4s approval standards in a given year
(t;Big-4   t;NonBig-4) and the degree to which this tightening is felt in a given MSA as measured
by the share of deposits in 2008 held with Big-4 banks
 
Big-4 Deposit Sharem;08

. The results
are similar if we instead use the Big-4s share of branches in an MSA.
Second, we use the partition L = fTested;NotTestedg to estimate (A1) and analogously
dene the stress test shock as
Sm;t = (t;Tested   t;NonTested) Stress Test Sharem;08: (A3)
As in our cross-sectional analysis, we dene stress-tested lenders as those which underwent
a CCAR test between 2011-2015, and Stress Test Sharem;08 as the 2008 mortgage application
share of these lenders. The interpretation of Sm;t is similar to that of Vm;t, in that it captures
the relative stringency of stress-tested lenders in a given year and an MSAs exposure to those
lenders.
The third instrument does not partition the set of lenders L according to regulatory criteria.
This addresses any concern that we impose the wrong prior on which lenders are subject to
common credit supply shocks. In the spirit of Greenstone, Mas and Nguyen (2015) or Amiti
and Weinstein (2013), we estimate a separate xed e¤ect t;k for each lender k 2 f1; :::; 20g
among the top 20 by national application share in year t, and an additional xed e¤ect t;21
for the remaining lenders, collectively.28 We then dene the credit supply shock Gm;t as
Gm;t =
21X
k=1
t;k  Sharek;m;t; (A4)
where Sharek;m;t denotes the mortgage application share of lender k from MSA m in year t.29
28For computational simplicity, we estimate the denial propensity (A1) year-by-year. The reference lenders
for each year are those outside the top-20, l21.
29We do not use application shares from some base year because it is not always clear how to track individual
lenders over time. For example, Taylor, Bean & Whitaker was a top-20 lender in 2008, but shut down its
operations in 2009.
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Our fourth instrument follows Loutskina and Strahan (2015). Lenders are more willing to
approve loan applications below the conforming loan limit because they come with an implicit
guarantee from the Government Sponsored Enterprises. Prior to 2008, changes in these limits
were determined at the national level. The 2008 Economic Stimulus Act revised this method-
ology so that changes in the conforming loan limit are now tied to the cost of living in a given
county. To account for this, we compute national average conforming limit excluding MSA m.
Then, for MSA m, we use the fraction of mortgage applications from MSA m in year t   1
within 5% of this national average. By excluding MSA m when computing the national aver-
age, we avoid capturing the local factors driving changes in the conforming limits, as with the
instruments used by Loutskina and Strahan (2015).
We use the time-varying credit supply instruments to estimate (2). Since Figures A4 and A5
indicated that much of the temporal variation in credit tightness occurred after 2010, we begin
the analysis in 2009. OurMSA-year controls inXm;t are the lagged rst-di¤erence in: log median
household income, log median inhabitant age, log population, and the unemployment rate. We
intentionally exclude lagged rent growth as a control because models with lagged dependent
variables are usually misspecied (Angrist and Pischke 2009), and we cluster standard errors by
MSA to allow for serial correlation throughout our sample period.30 Finally, we follow Favara
and Imbs (2015) and lag our credit supply shocks by one period.31
Validity of the Panel Instruments
Table A7 reestimates (2) after individually removing each one of the instruments. Regard-
less of which instrument we remove, the point estimates are consistently signicant and between
2.0 and 2.1. Moreover, we perform the di¤erence-in-Sargan test that the removed instrument is
exogenous. The corresponding C-statistics are highly insignicant across specications, which
suggests that the instruments are valid. Taken together, our results from this section and our
cross-sectional analysis suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in denial rates has led to
between a 1.3 and 2 percentage point increase in annualized rent growth over the post-crisis
period.
30We thank an anonymous referee who brought both points to our attention.
31For example, we use Vm;t 1 as an instrument for Deniedm;t  Deniedm;t  Deniedm;t 1.
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Figures and Tables for the Online Appendix
Figure A1. Comparison of Rent Indices. This gure plots annual change in log rents
based on the Zillow Rent Index, used in this paper, and the St. Louis Fed Rent Index over 1983-
2015. The St. Louis Index covers 10 MSAs (Atlanta, GA; Anchorage, AK; Phoenix-Mesa, AZ; Kansas
City, MO; Pittsburgh, PA; Honolulu, HI; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN; San Diego, CA; Tampa Bay-St.
Petersburg-Clearwater, FL; St. Louis, MO). The 45-degree line is in red.
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Figure A2. Post-2010 Denial Rates and Credit Supply Instruments. This gure
plots average denial rates based on the credit supply instruments. We rst residualize denial rates
based on the controls in Table 2. In all plots, the red line denotes MSAs with a high (25%) exposure
to the shock, and the blue dashed line denotes MSAs with a low (bottom 25%) exposure.
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Figure A3. Denial Rates for Big-4 and Stress Tested Lenders. This gure plots the
mortgage denial rate for the Big-4 banks and lenders subject to a stress test between 2011-2015.
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Figure A4. Propensity to Deny a Mortgage based on Big-4 Exposure. The top
panel plots the lender-year xed e¤ects estimated in equation A1 for Big-4 and non Big-4 lenders
over 2008-2014. Specically, equation A1 is a linear probability model of mortgage denial which
controls for the applicants log income, requested loan-to-income, race, and MSA-year, lender-MSA,
and lender-year xed e¤ects. The dashed lines correspond to a 95% condence interval, computed with
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The reference lender-year category is non Big-4 lenders in
2007, for which the denial probability was 15.6%. The bottom panel has an analogous gure for the
2000-2003 period, where the reference category is non Big-4 lenders in 2004.
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Figure A5. Propensity to Deny a Mortgage based on Exposure to Stress-Tested
Lenders. The top panel plots lender-year xed e¤ects estimated as in equation A1 for stress-tested
and non stress-tested lenders over 2000-2003, where stress-tested lenders are those which underwent a
CCAR test between 2011-2015. The dashed lines correspond to a 95% condence interval, computed
with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The reference lender-year category is non stress-tested
lenders in 2007. The bottom panel has an analogous plot for the 2000-2003 period, and the reference
category is non stress-tested lenders in 2004.
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Figure A6. Propensity to Deny Mortgages to FHA Borrowers and to Blacks
or Hispanics. The top panel plots the lendersxed e¤ects estimated as in equation A1 for FHA
loans. The dashed lines correspond to a 95% condence interval, computed with heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors. The reference lender-year category is non Big-4 lenders in 2007, for which
the denial probability for FHA loans was 14.8%. The bottom panel plots the lendersxed e¤ects
estimated as in equation A1 for loan applications by blacks and Hispanics, which we call minority
loans. The dashed lines correspond to a 95% condence interval, computed with heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors. The reference lender-year category is as in the top panel and the corresponding
denial probability for minority loans was 25.6%.
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Table A1: Correlation Matrix
Big-4 Tested Top 20
Big-4 1
Tested 0.191 1
Top 20 0.312 0.710 1
Note: This table shows the correlation matrix for the credit supply instruments. Big-4 denotes
the branch deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008. Tested denotes the 2008 mortgage applica-
tion share of lenders which underwent a stress test between 2011-2015. Top 20 is the DAcunto
and Rossi (2017) instrument, that is, the 2007 origination share of the top 20 mortgage lenders
that year.
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Table A2: Rent Growth and Credit Supply: Sample Sensitivity
Outcome: Avg Rent Growthm;10 14 Avg Rent Growthc;10 14
Avg Denial Ratemsa;10 14 0.988
(0.021)
Avg Denial Ratecounty;10 14 0.487
(0.008)
Sample Non-Headquarter Full
Geographic Unit MSA County
MSA Controls Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.007 0.001
J-statistic (p-value) 0.125 0.466
Number of Observations 215 556
Note: P-values are in parentheses. The rst column re-estimates our baseline specication from
Table 2 excluding MSAs in a state with or adjacent to a Big-4 headquarter (CA, NC, NY, CT,
NJ). The second column uses the full sample, but at the county level, so that each observation
is a county, not an MSA. The instruments for Avg Denial Rate and the MSA controls are
the same as in Table 2. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table A3: Robustness: Credit Supply Instruments and Drivers of Housing Rents
Outcome: Testedm;08 Big-4m;08 Testedm;08 Big-4m;08
Avg Rent Growthm;00 08 -0.319 -0.131 -0.192 -0.005
(0.330) (0.892) (0.010) (0.952)
log(Rentm;09) -0.181 0.124 0.022 -0.207
(0.643) (0.912) (0.773) (0.186)
log(House Pricem;09) 0.647 -0.368 0.376 0.146
(0.158) (0.788) (0.000) (0.392)
log(Populationm;09) 0.125 0.471 0.026 0.243
(0.755) (0.650) (0.678) (0.018)
log(Incomem;09) 0.296 -0.075 0.051 0.043
(0.438) (0.952) (0.607) (0.781)
Avg Unemp. Growthm;10 14 -0.170 -0.081 -0.030 0.070
(0.496) (0.928) (0.569) (0.327)
Avg Price Growthm;10 14 0.123 -0.210 0.113 -0.081
(0.608) (0.832) (0.095) (0.332)
Financial Services Sharem;08 -0.274 0.433 0.056 0.047
(0.214) (0.430) (0.410) (0.704)
Homeownership Ratem;09 -0.064 0.062
(0.566) (0.853)
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.832 0.503 0.680 0.373
Number of Observations 60 60 255 255
Note: P-values are in parentheses. All variables are standardized to have a standard deviation
of 1. The outcome in each column is one of our credit supply instruments: (i) the 2008
mortgage application share of lenders which underwent a stress test between 2011-2015; and
(ii) the branch deposit share of the Big-4 banks in 2008. Homeownership rates are from the
U.S. Census Bureaus Housing Vacancy Survey. Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table A4: Panel Analysis: Credit Supply and Rent Growth
Outcome:  log(Rentm;t)
Deniedm;t -0.017 2.074
(0.823) (0.003)
Estimation OLS IV
MSA-Year Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.001
J-statistic (p-value) 0.916
Number of Observations 1542 1542
Note: Standard errors are clustered by MSA. P-values are in parentheses.  log(Rentm;t) and
Deniedm;t denote the change in log rents and denial rate from year t-1 to year t, respectively.
The instruments for Deniedm;t are: (i) Vm;t 1; the Big-4s branch deposit share in 2008 in
MSA m multiplied by the di¤erence in denial propensity between the Big-4 and non Big-4
lenders in year t-1; (ii) Sm;t 1, the mortgage application share of stress-tested lenders in 2008
multiplied by the di¤erence in denial propensity between stress-tested and non stress-tested
lenders in year t-1. Stress-tested lenders are those subject to CCAR between 2011-2015; (iii)
Gm;t 1; the weighted average denial propensity among the top 20 lenders in an MSA in year
t-1, with weights determined by mortgage application shares in that year; (iv) the fraction of
applications from MSA m in year t-1 within 5% of the national average conforming loan limit
in year t, where the average excludes MSA m. Instrument (iv) is a version of that used by
Loutskina and Strahan (2015) suitable for the post-2008 period. The online appendix contains
a thorough description of each instrument. MSA controls are the lagged changes in: log median
household income, log median inhabitant age, log population, and the unemployment rate. The
underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). The sample period is 2009-2014.
Each observation is an MSA-year.
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Table A5: Panel Placebo: Credit Supply and Rents Before the Crisis
Outcome:  log(Rentm;t)
Deniedm;t -0.062 -0.004
(0.518) (0.121)
Credit Supply IV Tested Big-4
MSA-Year Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.477 0.016
Number of Observations 495 495
Note: P-values are in parentheses.  log(Rentm;t) and Deniedm;t denote the change in log
rents and denial rate from year t-1 to year t, respectively. The instruments for Deniedm;t are:
(i) in column 1, Sm;t 1; the branch deposit share of stress-tested lenders in 2008 multiplied by
the di¤erence in denial propensity between stress-tested and non stress-tested lenders in year
t-1. Stress-tested lenders are those subject to CCAR between 2011-2015; and (ii) in column 2,
Vm;t 1; the Big-4s branch deposit share in 2008 in MSA m multiplied by the di¤erence in denial
propensity between the Big-4 and non Big-4 lenders in year t-1. The online appendix contains
a thorough description of each instrument. MSA controls are the lagged changes in log median
household income. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). The
sample period is 2001-2003. Each observation is an MSA-year. Standard errors are clustered
by MSA.
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Table A6: Credit and Rents Pre-Crisis using the Loutskina and Strahan (2015) IV
Outcome:  log(Rentm;t)
Deniedm;t 0.070
(0.054)
Credit Supply IV CLL Shock
MSA-Year Controls Yes
Year FE Yes
MSA FE Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.009
Number of Observations 495
Note: P-values are in parentheses.  log(Rentm;t) and Deniedm;t denote the change in log
rents and denial rate from year t-1 to year t, respectively. The instrument for Deniedm;t is
the triple product of: (a) the fraction of applications from MSA m in year t-1 within 5% of the
conforming loan limit in year t; (b) MSA ms elasticity of housing supply estimated by Saiz
(2010); and (c) the change in the log conforming loan limit between year t-1 and year t. We
refer to this instrument, originally used by Loutskina and Strahan (2015), as the Conforming
Loan Limit (CLL) Shock. MSA controls are those from Table A5. The underidentication test
is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). The sample period is 2001-2003. Each observation is
an MSA-year. Standard errors are clustered by MSA.
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Table A7: Instrument Sensitivity in Panel Analysis
Outcome:  log(Rentm;t)
Deniedm;t 2.069 2.063 2.071 2.088
(0.004) (0.006) (0.097) (0.003)
Excluded Panel IV Big-4 Tested MSA Average CLL Fraction
MSA-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.001 0.001 0.088 0.000
J-statistic (p-value) 0.802 0.774 0.774 0.972
C-statistic (p-value) 0.786 0.959 0.949 0.499
Number of Observations 1542 1542 1542 1542
Note: P-values are in parentheses.  log(Rentm;t) and Deniedm;t denote the change in log
rents and denial rate from year t-1 to year t, respectively. The instruments for Deniedm;t are
those from Table A4. In each column, we exclude one of the instruments, as indicated in the
row Excluded IV. The C-Statistic corresponds to the di¤erence-in-Sargan test of the hypothesis
that the excluded instrument is valid; it is based on the di¤erence in J-Statistics when using
the full instrument set and when excluding the instrument in question. MSA controls are those
from Table A4. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). The sample
period is 2009-2014. Each observation is an MSA-year. Standard errors are clustered by MSA.
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Table A8: House Prices and Credit Supply
Outcome: Avg House Price Growthm;10 14
Testedm;08 0.026
(0.096)
Testedm;08 High Minoritym;08 -0.028
(0.007)
Home Type All
Estimation OLS
MSA Controls Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes
Number of Observations 257
Note: P-values are in parentheses. House Price Growthm;10 14 denotes the average annual
change in the log of MSA ms median house price for all homes, based on Zillows Home Value
Index (ZHVI). High Minoritym;08 denotes whether the MSA had an above-median share of
mortgage applications from blacks or Hispanics in 2009. Tested is the stress test instrumental
variable dened in Table 2. MSA controls are those from Table 2 and 2009 log house price. The
underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table A9: Multifamily Construction and Credit Supply
Outcome: Avg Multi-Family Permits Growthm;11 14
Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 14.965
(0.074)
Estimation IV
MSA Controls Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes
Underidentication test (p-value) 0.026
J-statistic (p-value) 0.159
Number of Observations 229
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Avg Multi-Family Permits Growthm;11 14 denotes the av-
erage annual change in log multifamily permits in MSA m over 2011-2014, to allow for a one
year lag in the supply response. The instruments for Avg Denial Ratem;10 14 are the variables
from Table 2. MSA controls are those from Table 2 and 2010 log multifamily permits. The
underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table A10: Rent Growth, Credit Supply, and Lending Frictions
Outcome: Avg Rent Growthm;10 14
Testedm;08 0.023
(0.376)
Testedm;08  Licensem 0.070
(0.045)
Estimation OLS
MSA Controls Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes
Number of Observations 257
Note: P-values are in parentheses. Licensem denotes whether the MSA is in a state requiring
mortgage brokers to be licensed. Tested is the stress test instrumental variable dened in Table
2. MSA controls are those from Table 2. The underidentication test is that of Kleibergen and
Paap (2006). Each observation is an MSA. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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